Can God create a rock so heavy that he can’t lift it?

EPIC LIKE

Objections like this are based on a misunderstanding of the word “Omnipotent.” If “Omnipotent” means “Can do anything,” then we are free to make up any self-contradictory nonsense and claim that it fits under the umbrella of “anything.” If, however, “Omnipotent” is defined as “All Powerful” in the sense of having all necessary power to do anything than can be done, then it makes more sense, and objections like this fail.

I’m probably not telling you anything you don’t already know. But when I hear things like this, I’m just bursting to point this out, but I usually have no audience because its when I’m in my car by myself listening to a lecture, podcast, debate, etc. This was an opportunity to open the valve and release this thought. Though I’m sure I didn’t actually give Glenn any information he didn’t already have by this.

Another “objection” that always bothers me is when an atheist looks at some undesirable state of affairs and says something like “well, why didn’t God just [insert whatever miraculous deus ex machina absurdity you want here].” For instance, something like, “If God was going to deliver the Iraelites from Egyptian slavery, why didn’t he just teleport the whole nation to the promised land by magic? Huh? Huh? Why didn’t he?” Underlying this is an assumption on the part of the atheist that the theist deep down doesn’t really believe in God and is just making it all up, and since we’re just making it all up, why not have “God” do something even more spectacular? Why limit ourselves this way? In this case it seems to be forgotten that the theist regards God as a real person who might have his reasons for doing or not doing things and in a certain way, and that we are not free to just invent whatever miraculous nonsense we think he should be doing.

That’s another one I just had to express somewhere.

Ha ha ha! Now tell us what you really think, Glenn! Excellent!

Similarly God cannot issue commandments for somebody to love him of their own free will.

Steven, if he can’t, it would be for reasons slightly different from the reasons that he cannot do the things listed here.

@ Glenn

“But I think I would dishonour the spirit of this particular blog entry to go there – into serious discussion of issues worthy of our time.”

I admire your restraint.

God can make a burrito too hot for him to eat… and then he’ll eat it.

Carr makes an excellent point.

Hold on! Here’s a more fundamental question:
Can God destroy himself?

Also if we limit God’s omnipotence to only things that are logically consistent, then are we saying God didn’t create the laws of logic?

Also these statements are not contradictory:
1. God can lift any rock that will ever exist.
2. God can (at his choice) create a rock that he can’t lift.

And one more point to ponder:
If you are the type of person who would never [insert morally destitute action] then does that mean that you can not [same action]?

Well you’re certainly keeping with the style of this post – stating things without backing them up in any way.

It’s not logically impossible to create something from nothing. It is just physically impossible. God can do things that are (to all who are constrained by the physical laws of the universe) physically impossible.

And “something coming from nothing” isn’t really the same proposition as “an omnipotent being creating something from nothing”

Here’s another way to look at it: Assuming there is no end to the causal chain, it’s impossible to draw any final conclusion on the origin of the universe — or anything else for that matter.

However, this doesn’t invalidate the idea of an uncreated — i.e. physically not “existing” — Creator of all things.

Sketch.

A logical impossibility would be something that is self-contradictory, such as “I have no money and I also have $75”

“We’re talking about the original advent of the physical here.”
Right, Theists claim that it is possible for something to come from nothing specifically when caused to do so by a non-physical entity. And your argument is that if that is possible, then it must also be possible for it to come from nothing without any assistance. But that doesn’t follow at all.

Nomological possibility is irrelevant. If it is possible for something to come from nothing, then the universe could have done so with and without the help of any God. If the universe could have come from nothing without God’s involvement, then God is redundant as an explanation for the existence of the universe. Sure, you can still believe in a redundant link in a causal chain but that’s an extremely unparsimonious ontology.

Colin

“A logical impossibility would be something that is self-contradictory, such as “I have no money and I also have $75?”

I agree. We share an understanding of what constitutes logical impossibility.

“Right, Theists claim that it is possible for something to come from nothing specifically when caused to do so by a non-physical entity. And your argument is that if that is possible, then it must also be possible for it to come from nothing without any assistance. But that doesn’t follow at all.”

Right, but that’s terribly ad hoc. My argument is that either it’s impossible or it’s possible. If it’s impossible, my former argument against God’s existence stands. If it’s possible, we don’t need God’s assistance, unless, of course, it is ONLY possible with God’s assistance. I assume this is your hypothetical theist’s (and perhaps your own) position, but I don’t see any justification for limiting the possibilities like this. At the very least you ought now provide a positive argument for the logical impossibility of something coming from nothing without God’s assistance. If there is no logical contradiction (like your money example) in something coming from nothing with God’s help, I fail to see what non-ad hoc reasoning you might employ to argue for a contradiction in something coming from nothing spontaneously. At least you would have to argue very carefully so as not to undermine the possibility of God doing it. Care to offer such an argument? I would honestly be intrigued to hear you out.

It seems ad hoc to me to say that only physical effects must have causes. I can’t think of any reason whatsoever, except apologetics, to maintain that non-physical effects (whatever those are supposed to be) require no causes whereas their physical counterparts do.

I’m not even sure what ‘physical’/’non-physical’ is supposed to mean in this context. I understand ‘physical’ means if we refer to ‘concrete existents’as opposed to ‘abstract existents’ but surely you don’t think God is an abstract entity. Surely you think God is a concrete existent, so evidently you have a division between ‘physical concretes’ and ‘non-physical concretes’ but that’s just so many words to me.

I fail to see why the distinction is useful or meaningful or why some concretes would require causes while other concretes get a free pass. Suppose I told you I think the universe entire is non-physical and therefore doesn’t require a cause? How would you argue against this position?

“Look at it this way, we observe that everything in the physical realm has a cause and so we infer that this must be the rule. But not being able to directly observe the non-physical, we refrain from making presuppositions about it.”

Erm…no you don’t. You just presupposed that its supposed existence doesn’t require any cause. Not to mention that you presupposed that it exists in the first place, even despite your inability to even tell me what it is.

“Sure I do, as have many philosophers down the ages. I think it’s called dualism. The point is that I believe God is real, but not comprised of matter/energy”

What does “real” mean in this context and what is God comprised of? Why and how do you suppose Godstuff is sufficiently different from otherstuff to warrant a non-physical/physical distinction? Suppose we had some “real” stuff “over here.” (Or “up there” or whathaveyou.) Let’s call it barglestuff. What is the determining criteria for concluding that barglestuff is physical or non-physical?

This is basically the crux of what I’m asking you.

“That’d be a hard sell, and kind of contrary to our understanding of the terms.”

It’s not contrary to my understanding of the terms, since I don’t understand the terms at all and you refuse to help me along the path of understanding. If God, the universe, and barglestuff all possess concrete existence – are equally “real.” What, exactly, makes God non-physica, the universe physical, and how do we determine which category barglestuff falls into?

Which necessary and sufficient conditions for demarcation between “physicality” and “non-physicality” make me wrong in my hypothetical claim that the universe is non-physical?

Hey, if you don’t know, just say so. But then at least admit that you have no idea what you’re talking about. Otherwise, please try to be patient in explaining it to me, because I sure don’t.

“You just presupposed that its supposed existence doesn’t require any cause.”
No I didn’t, because I’m not trying to prove anything about it’s cause, so I need no presupposition. You’re the one trying to prove something about God (that he doesn’t exist)

“Not to mention that you presupposed that it exists in the first place”
No, I inferred that it exists by its necessity to cause the universe.

“What does “real” mean in this context and what is God comprised of?”
I don’t know what God is comprised of.

“What is the determining criteria for concluding that barglestuff is physical or non-physical?”
Physical things consist of matter, energy, and I suppose the forces that act on them.

“It’s not contrary to my understanding of the terms, since I don’t understand the terms at all”
I’m not offering any wild new defenition of the universe here. Intuitively it is ‘all of physical reality’. You’re proposal that “the universe entire is non-physical” doesn’t make much sense in that light.

“and you refuse to help me along the path of understanding.”
No need to get hostile. I haven’t refused anything.

“how do we determine which category barglestuff falls into?”
is it comprised of matter, energy or the forces thereof?

“Which necessary and sufficient conditions for demarcation between “physicality” and “non-physicality” make me wrong in my hypothetical claim that the universe is non-physical?”
the universe as defined above is comprised of matter, energy and forces.

“But then at least admit that you have no idea what you’re talking about.”
Certainly. I certainly don’t have this all figured out, analyzed, explained and wrapped in a bow, but that doesn’t mean it’s untrue.

Colin,

“No I didn’t, because I’m not trying to prove anything about it’s cause, so I need no presupposition. You’re the one trying to prove something about God (that he doesn’t exist)”

No, I provided you an argument for God’s non-existence based on certain premises, each of which have ample support among theists and each of which would have implications for theism if denied. I then asked you which implications you were willing to concede in defending your theism. And come now, you did implicitly presuppose that non-physical effects do not similarly necessitate a cause as do the physical.

“No, I inferred that it exists by its necessity to cause the universe.”

In which case your mode of inference bears the common title of “argument from ignorance.” Not to mention that you have not explained to me what this supposed “it” you fallaciously inferred to exist actually is.

“I don’t know what God is comprised of.”

Right. I don’t either. So really neither of us knows what you’re talking about.

“Physical things consist of matter, energy, and I suppose the forces that act on them.”

Great. You have told me what non-physical concretes are not. Now, please do tell me what they are. Abstracta – e.g. the ‘number 7’ and ‘democracy’ – don’t consist of matter, energy, or forces either, but that doesn’t make them non-physical concretes. I know what it is for a physical concrete to exist; it has a spatiotemporal location, say. Or more trivially, I can point at it, prod it, experience it etc.

I can also sort of get my head around what it means for a non-physical non-concrete object to exist, though admittedly it’s a little trickier. Democracy exists as joint act of human beings, say. Or the number 7 exists by virtue of representing a certain generic quantity of anythings. In any case if you want to say ‘God’ exists as an abstracta, I would absolutely agree with you. But then, you would maintain that God exists as a non-physical concrete. I don’t know what that means. At all.

You could perhaps tell me a story about how God exists in roughly the same way as forces of nature do – i.e. by having a certain causal influence on physical concretes. (God allegedly having created them.) But then that would only compound the issue of why God then is not a physical force of nature rather than a non-physical whatever-he-is.

“I’m not offering any wild new defenition of the universe here. Intuitively it is ‘all of physical reality’. You’re proposal that “the universe entire is non-physical” doesn’t make much sense in that light.”

Now you’re just being circular. of course my proposal that the universe is non-physical makes no sense if you have defined it as physical. I’m not asking you the definition of the universe. What I’m asking of you is to coherently explain your proposed demarcation between physical and non-physical concretes, or perhaps a satisfactory conceptual analysis of “non-physical concrete” existence. I know what a physical concrete is. I don’t know what a non-physical concrete is.

“No need to get hostile. I haven’t refused anything.”

I wasn’t being hostile. I was just pointing out your explanatory inadequacy and your continued failure to produce anything of substance. You might have detected a hint of frustration, but I assure you there was no ill-will behind my words.

“is it comprised of matter, energy or the forces thereof?”

Let’s say it isn’t. Then how do we tell if it exists or doesn’t? How do we tell if it’s an abstract or a concrete non-physical? (Please note that I’m not driving at any epistemological point here. It might be the case that we can’t actually know whether barglestuff exists or whether it falls within one category or the other. I’m just looking for a general characterisation of what barglestuff existence entails or the demarcation between abstract and concrete non-physical barglestuff.)

“the universe as defined above is comprised of matter, energy and forces.”

Very well. How does that help us along? What is it about stuff made out of matter, energy, and forces that necessitates preceding causes? What is it about supposed non-physical constituents that foregoes this necessity? What exactly are these constituents? What does it mean to say they exist?

Suppose I take your word for it that “physical” means “comprised of matter, energy, and forces” and further take your word for it that the non-physical does not require preceding causes. Suppose I tell you that matter, energy, and forces are not comprised out of matter, energy, and forces, are therefore non-physical, and therefore do not require any causes? Will you then say that matter, energy, and forces are themselves physical and embrace circular reasoning wholeheartedly?

“Certainly. I certainly don’t have this all figured out, analyzed, explained and wrapped in a bow, but that doesn’t mean it’s untrue.”

No, for all I know it might be true that “slythee toves gyre and gimble in the wabe,” but I wouldn’t dream of asserting its truth, since I have no idea what it means. You on the other hand seem to be quite happy to make assertions you yourself don’t understand. Sort of like an obstinately insistent man who’s picked up a smatter of Russian phrases phonetically and now adamantly tells everyone they’re gospel even if he himself understands no Russian whatsoever and has no idea what he’s saying. That’s quite comical, really.

its always strange when folks talk about immaterial things as if they are really just invisible material things. It’s sketchy philosophy… hrrm.

Sketch,

You said, “if there is no end to the causal chain, then either God didn’t cause anything or something caused God. So yes, it would precisely invalidate an uncreated creator of all things. There can be no uncaused causes in an infinite causal chain.”

This is what they call the mystery of the origin of creation — that there is no beginning and no end to creation, that the notion of a Creator presupposes a creation, much like a king presupposes a kingdom with subjects etc.

But again, in this perspective, the ultimate Cause of causes is also known as God, the Uncreated, the Unknowable, the Almighty.

matt, agreed.

Glenn, I don’t know what you’re talking about the Kalaam cosmological argument. As I told Eugene further up I wasn’t referencing that argument. I was specifically contending with the two common theist claims that “God cannot do the logically impossible” and “it’s logically impossible for something to come from nothing.” (Both claims which I have heard theists make on numerous occasions.) Whether the Kalaam cosmological argument includes any of these as a premise is irrelevant. I never said that it does.

Now, you end up talking about an “eternal non-physical cause” of the universe. I assume we’re not talking about some unified field theory formula, which by principle “causes” there to be something rather than nothing. Am I right in my assumption that you, like Colin before you, posit the existence of non-physical concretes? Because then perhaps you would like to answer the questions, which Colin has become so skilled in evading?

Whether naturalism is true or false is no matter to a poor uninformed fellow like me, who doesn’t know what naturalism is.

Bui Tyril, oh well, if it’s a mystery then it must be true. You’ve certainly convinced me. 🙂

That one was directed at you, sketch, hence the pun.

I wonder if what Matt was referring to was your insistence to ask ‘material’ questions of the ‘immaterial’, such as “what is God comprised of?”

matt, you’re right that does sound terribly condescending, extremely arrogant, and completely uncalled for. I would have expected more of the frequent visitors to this blog than this sort of unphilosophy-like conduct, especially since the author of the blog has a phd in philosophy. I don’t see what kind of aid you think commenting on some random blog on the internet could possible lend to my education. I suppose you imagine that universities the world over are trawling the world wide web for comments made under silly handles and go “By golly! Look at this chap! He sure showed those other commenters! By jove! We must award this ‘Sketch’ person a degree poste haste for his-or-her efforts!” Ah, but I am feeding the trolls. Back under the bridge with you! Git!

Sketch, whether you named the Kalaam argument or not, it’s perfectly clear that the issues in discussion just are the issues addressed by that argument, and your denial notwithstanding, you do know why I am talking about that argument. You have chosen not to address my criticisms of your criticism, which is fine.

As for the rest of what’s going on here, please remember that by commenting here you have agreed to the blog policy.

I was pointing out that the other good people on the board were having to educate you, not myself. My degrees are in fine art, but I find that it is good for my practice to keep up with science and philosophy, so I enjoy blogs like this one and comment now and then. I’m not sure that my education disqualifies my knowledge in a particular area outside of my specialization. it might make my knowledge suspect, but only if I were to consistently demonstrate an inability to engage with the subject competently by failing to understand or use the language of that subject properly or by misrepresenting whole theories, models, etc, or failing to understand or even know the very model I was defending. (I’m sure that last sentence was a good reason to call my mastery of syntax into question).

“a criteria of identity”
Huh? Is this something to do with proving that God is a person?

“or a conceptual analysis of ‘non-physical concretes’”
Huh? Isn’t conceptual analysis an oxymoron?

Again, you’re using very big words. Are we agreed that neither of these things really has much to do with your original argument?

Colin,
I’m sorry for my “big words.” I only use them because I assumed that a philosophy-interested audience (this being a philosophy-blog and all) would be familiar with them, as they are quite basic, fundamental, and well-known to contemporary philosophy and its practitioners. They are also easily Googlable and readily available on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. But I’ll happily give you some simplified explanations with a direct link to in-depth resources.

A proposition is a declarative sentence with a truth-value – i.e. a statement, which is either true or false. You can read more about propositions on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Paradigm examples of propositions are “the ball is red,” “Greg is taller than Jill” etc.

Truth-conditions are the circumstances, which need to be the case (in the world) in order for a proposition to obtain its truth-value. You can read more about truth-conditions on the SEP. Examples of truth-conditions for the mentioned propositions would be exactly what you think. The actual ball referred to by “the ball” would actually have to have the property of “being red,” the actual height of the person referred to as “Greg” would actually have to be greater than the person referred to as “Jill” etc.

No, criteria of identity have nothing to do with whether God’s a person. A criterion of identity is the conditions under which two objects, entities, classes (or whathaveyou) are determined to be ‘the same’ or ‘not the same.’ You can read mora about criteria of identity here on the SEP. The criterion of identity for mathematical sets is ‘sets are identical if and only if they share all and exactly the same members.’ The criterion of identity for “physical concretes” could be ‘physical objects are identical if and only if they occupy exactly and wholly the same spacetime coordinates.’ It is widely accepted among metaphysicians that whatever you populate your ontology (philosophy of existence) with, you must be able to provide a criterion of identity for it.

No, conceptual analysis is not, to my knowledge, an oxymoron. Conceptual analysis (also called philosophical analysis) is a valuable philosophical tool to ensure clarity in our terms. Conceptual analysis consists of the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions under which a concept applies. You can read more about conceptual analyses here on the SEP. A paradigm case of such analyses – fathered by Socrates – is knowledge being “justified true belief.” Though a more trivial example could be the sufficiency of being a lobster and the necessity of being an animal in order to be a crustacean.

I hope this helps. At least I might have aided matt in his philosophical education. 🙂

Kind regards
Sketch

Sketch, your initial argument has as its first premise, the proposition that “If God exists, God created everything from nothing” and another premise about the possibility of something coming from nothing. The kalaam argument is not tangential to that, it is central. I suspect you see this too, actually.

So I will just note, again, that you have not responded to my criticisms of your argument, you are just proceeding as though your argument is unscathed. You haven’t even offered a bad response, you are just treating my response like the elephant in the room that you don’t want to talk about. I have shown where I think your argument fails and fails completely, and you are welcome to interact with my criticisms. The way you are criticising others, I would assume that you don’t want to be seen as ignoring criticisms of your own argument. The offer is there.

As for whether any comment counts as harassment or abuse of other people as mentioned in my blog policy, well that’s my call and nobody else’s, but your thoughts are noted. 🙂

I realized that I said “show of goodwill” above where I meant that I was “attempting to redeem some goodwill for myself” by laying out a more thorough case in response to sketch’s contentions. Sorry, “show of goodwill” comes off as pretty cocky, but I didn’t mean that.

So as I was saying…. God can’t create a rock so heavy that he can’t lift it.

Actually i’m feeling quite gruntled at the moment. This is easily defined as being the positve emotional and mental state which is the opposite of disgruntled where “dis” is a prefix indicating reversal, negation or removal. Happy happy joy joy.

I still want to know if you believe that God created the laws of logic.

Sketch, you invented the phrase “non-physical concretes”, so maybe you should tell us what you mean by it, or why it is so important to you?

And if we’re going to proceed down this tangent, then at least could you admit that it has nothing to do with your original argument, the flaws of which have been clearly pointed out, and apparently not contended by you.

Hmm…I suspect what has gone wrong in our dialogue. I wasn’t trying to “prove” God’s non-existence. I was trying to point out that talk about unliftable rocks can be interesting. I constructed an argument out of the premise that omnipotence excluding logical impossibility (which I take to be the go-to reason to discard the problem of the rock) and I pointed out that, since theists presumably don’t want to concede the conclusion of the argument, and since the argument is valid, they will have to deny one of the premises. I then pointed out that the denial of each of the premises is interesting. Thus by extension the problem of the unliftable rock can be philosophically interesting. Since we’re still talking about the (tangential) denial of one of the premises of my original argument, am I wrong in deeming it interesting?

“since the argument is valid”
The argument is poop.

” they will have to deny one of the premises”
The way you’re using it, virtually every theist will deny #2, and there’s nothing really interesting about it.

” Since we’re still talking about the (tangential) denial of one of the premises of my original argument”
Which premise do you consider the discussion of non-physical concrete to be particularly relevant to?

I recall someone trying to pull this one on me.

What it boils down to is, can God do the logically impossible? Well, he can’t.

“God also cannot dig a ditch that’s so wide he can’t jump over it.”

Why? Well, such a ditch would be infinity wide. In order to jump such a ditch, God would have to be able to jump an infinite distance + 1m.

Simply put, infinity + 1 is still infinity. You cannot (by definition) have a greater number.

The riddle treats infinity as something that it is not – a definite value which can be incremented.

We describe God as limitless in various ways. But that is in terms of his ability to deal with the physical world – not logic. God can’t do something that is by sheer definition impossible, such as creating a number greater than infinity.

Didn’t a Biblical angel declare that nothing is impossible for God? Was the angel speaking in error, exaggerating, or what?

I see here an example of a fictional writer exposing his ignorance of logic and later scribes neglecting to correct the error. Presumably, a real angel would know better than to claim God could do the impossible because if that’s what is meant by God then God can’t exist.

Ah, a lot of water under the bridge since my last post. No new responses despite the premature call for me to throw the towel. I shall interpret the four month hiatus of my debating opponents as a tacit concession that the towel was theirs to throw all along. Too bad they didn’t have the intellectual integrity to admit this explicitly.

Powell, I suppose the angel should have said to Mary, “What’s more, your relative Elizabeth has become pregnant in her old age! People used to say she was barren, but she has conceived a son and is now in her sixth month. For nothing is impossible with God, except that which is logically impossible. Let me explain. There is that which is logically impossible, and that which is nomologically impossible. A logical impossibility means that which involves a contradiction, or is incoherent; for example, changing the colour of a number, or making a square-circle. That which is nomologically impossible means that there is an important sense in which it is impossible, e.g, the laws of nature forbid it. What I’m talking about here is nomological impossibility” Because obviously, as a first century Palestinian Jewish peasant, Mary was interested in western philosophy and logic.

There’s this nifty little thing called “context” which is useful when it comes to reading texts.

Sometimes atheists normally use it, but for some strange reason they stop when they are reading parts of the Bible and then pretend that they have made a useful point.

Meanwhile, theists (and even intellectually honest atheists) don’t take these kind of people or what they say seriously.

No points for guessing which you group you belong to.

“Kill yourself” …maybe re-phrase that one…